T he extent of a country's technological development provides a measure of its international competitiveness. Since the lead in terms of productivity and quality that can be achieved by improving traditional technologies is becoming progressively smaller, the industrial countries can no longer offset their comparative cost disadvantages, especially as regards labour. Europe is coming under ever increasing competitive pressure in the production of goods embodying middle-level technology.
According to the EC Commission, however, European enterprises are already lagging dangerously far behind the USA and Japan in high technology as well? The reason why this was so serious was that the "third industrial revolution" in the Pacific was leading not just to the development of improved products or processes but to the emergence of an entire new dimension of products and processes. The importance of these new technologies extended beyond their own particular industry and its relative weight within the economy; whoever possessed them also dominated the other industries, because they, as components or ingredients, made possible the development of new classes of products and processes that could not otherwise be developed; the new technologies were the key to future prosperity. 2
In the view of the Commission, Europe is therefore in a critical position if it wishes to continue to influence world events as a third independent force. Its enterprises would have to master the new technologies and even work themselves into a leading position if they were not to be at the mercy of the giant Japanese and * university of T0bingen, West Germany.
INTERECONOMICS, May/June 1988 US concerns exploiting their technological and size advantages and which in future wanted to control not only world markets but also European markets, something they would ultimately achieve. 3
If the suspected technological gap cannot be closed, the fate of Europe will be at stake, not just that of individual firms that have to throw in the towel for lack of competitiveness. More specifically, if Siemens or Philips or both together cannot eliminate the lead of their Japanese and American competitors in semi-conductor technology they will not be the only ones to suffer; the international competitiveness of the European economies as a whole will be weakened. 4 If the lack of competitiveness in key technologies is really not just, say, Siemens' problem but a macroeconomic one, the natural conclusion to be drawn is that Siemens should receive state aid.
This conclusion not only scandalises certain academics, often dubbed "market purists", but has also far-reaching financial consequences. A memorandum entitled "Microelectronics 2000" argues that state aid is unavoidable, since the development of a competitive semi-conductor industry would entail cumulative R and D expenditure of around DM 21 billion and additional investment of DM 14 billion, sums that cannot be raised solely by the companies themselves, s The memorandum states that it is therefore crucial that most of the DM 21 billion to be spent on R and D between now and the end of the century be met from public funds 6 and proposes that more than DM 1 billion a year be provided for this purpose until the year 2000J The German Federal Government considers this line of argument to be valid in principle and agrees that financial assistance is essentially justified, 8 so that this is more than just a skirmish about the role of the state.
List's Infant Industry Argument
Let us test the validity of the line of argumentation in the memorandum by briefly examining its theoretical basis. According to the document, parts of our industry must be protected (supported financially) for a number of years (roughly until the year 2000) so that it can catch up with its competitors in other countries. At the same time, aid for key industries will maintain and improve the productive strength and international competitiveness of the entire economy.
These were precisely the arguments used in the first half of the nineteenth century by Frieddch List in his advocacy of temporary protection for emerging industries in countries that were still striving to catch up with the mature industrial nations, at that time the United Kingdom. In one key respect List therefore diverged from the view of the English classical school that free trade was beneficial for all trading partners. He did not deny that this was so in principle, but he wanted to stress the limited explanatory value of this concept: it was valid in the case where all the trading partners had mature production functions. The free trade concept based on the theory of relative prices was, as it were, static; if the development potentials of the infant industries were considered in the light of their specific production 9 Vice President Narjes of the EC Commission describes "preventive intervention to ward off massive distortions of competition as a result of the voluntadstic policies of other countries" as justification for having a technology policy. Cf. K.-H. N a r j e s, op. cit., p. 29.
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functions and the changes in relative prices that would occur, they would be competitive once they had achieved their optimum production function; thus they had to be given the opportunity to do so.
List therefore proposed that infant industries in developing economies should be protected from foreign competition for a period of time by means of customs duties (external protection). This would oblige the population in the developing economies and those producers that are processing imported products to pay more for imported goods. They would all make the forced saving imposed by the state so that the economy as a whole would become all the more prosperous in later years. We are therefore dealing with a redistribution of income from the consumers and/or the processing industries burdened with the customs duties to the protected industries.
Protection for "Mature" Industries?
The justification and the method of protection now being proposed accord with the List approach, except that external protection has been replaced by domestic protection (subsidies) and "infant" industries have been replaced by traditional, "mature" or "old" industries when we here take as an example the promotion of the electronics industry in semi-conductor technology. This would of course run counter to List's line of argument, for to subsidise "mature" industries would mean that formerly leading industries had let essential developments pass them by or that Iocational advantages had changed because foreign competitors had been able to expoit their development potential and drive the "mature industries" from their traditional markets. It follows that technology policies aimed at supporting particular new lines of development in traditional industries cannot seek justification in List's "theory of productive forces".
Or are there aspects that cast a new light on the List argument? It could be held that if the battle for future key markets and hence for a kind of economic hegemony were fought fairly by the other two economic "superpowers", the USA and Japan, there would be no need to interfere in the free play of market forces; an improvement in the general conditions for investment and innovation would be sufficient. 9 However, the other countries were not abiding by the rules of free competition.
Such violations of the rules of the game can take two forms: the investment of massive financial resources in specific types of research and the possible prohibition of European access to high technology or high-tech
